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CASES NOTED
guaranteed by the New York Constitution' 7 and statutes' 8 were needlessly
sacrificed to the ends of summary law enforcement, since his arraign-
ment as a material witness afforded the police an opportunity to keep him
in custody and thereby easily obtain a confession. When officers delay in
taking a defendant before a magistrate for the purpose of obtaining a
confession, they are in reality violating the constitutional provision that
"no courts save those provided for in this Constitution shall be estab-
lished."' It is submitted that a confession obtained by criminal means
should not be introduced into evidence, thereby denying a defendant the
specific protection afforded by statutes.
TORTS - WAIVER NOT PERMITTED TO EXTEND STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS WHERE LIBEL IS BASIS OF ACTION
An action was brought to recover from the defendant the proceeds of
a book which allegedly libeled the plaintiff. The one year statute of limi-
tations barred an action for recovery of damages for libel. Plaintiff brought
this action under the six year statute2 for money had and received. Held,
complaint dismissed. The remedy for libel does not embrace the right to
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit. Hart v. E. P. Dutton & Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d
871 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
In situations where an election of remedies is allowed, the effect of waiv-
ing the tort and suing in assumpsit is to make the "contract" statute of limi-
tations applicable.3 Since the election of remedies is not granted automatically
at the option of the plaintiff, the nature of the tort he chooses to waive is
important. Generally, a waiver has been permitted in cases of conversion, 4
deceit and fraud 5 to allow recovery from the defendant for anything which
had been taken from the plaintiff.6 Usually, however, the election is denied
in negligence7 and trespass,8 especially where there has been no benefit to
the defendant.
17. N.Y. CONST., Art. 1, § 6.
18. N.Y. CODE OF CRaM. PROC. § 165, 395.
19. Commonwealth v. Mayhew, 178 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Ky. 1943).
1. N.Y. CIVIL PPACTICE ACT § 51.
2. Id. at § 48.
3. Dougherty v. Norlin, 147 Kan. 565, 78 P.2d 65 (1938). But cf. Schlick v.
N.Y. Dugan Bros., Inc., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
4. See Terry v. Munger, 121 N.Y. 161, 24 N.E. 272 (1890).
5. McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 527, 36 P.2d 642 (1934) j Addy v. Stewart,
69 Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 (1949). But see Brevard County Bldg. & Loan v. Sumrall,
101 Fla. 1189, 1197, 133 So. 888, 891 (1931).
6. See Wilson v. Shrader, 79 S.E. 1083, 1086 (W.Va. 1913).
7. Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932).
8. Tightmeyer v. Mongold, 20 Kan. 90 (1875).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Recovery in assumpsit is based on the obligation created by law that one
person shall not enrich himself at the expense of another.9 So, when the
plaintiff has suffered a loss, the court will grant relief in assumpsit on the
fiction of an implied agreement to compensate.' 0 It seems that the loss
suffered by the plaintiff must be tangible.' Resort to the fiction of contract
will be denied where the relief asked for is damages; the sole remedy for the
recovery of damages is by a suit in tort.'2 The duty of the tortfeasor to pay
damages does not imply a promise upon which assumpsit may be main-
tained, 13 since the individual is under no contractual duty to refrain from
the commission of a tort."4
The remedy for libel had its origin in the common law form of an action
on the case, where damage was the gist of the action." The main elements
of the action are the wrongful act of the defendant and the injury to the
plaintiff."6 The injury is frequently one to personality, affecting feelings and
sensibilities, though it may be an injury to substance.17 An analogy has been
suggested between libel and the invasion of privacy, both of which have
generally been referred to as injuries personal in nature." The basic differ-
ence between the two is that the right to privacy concerns one's peace of
mind while the right to freedom from defamation primarily affects one's
reputation.' 9 Although the right to privacy has been treated as a personal
and not a property right in most instances, it has been the basis for relief
in cases involving the use of photographs on the theory of breach of an
implied contract 2 Similarly, equity has enjoined defamation where the
resultant damage could be connected with a property interest, such as the
writer's letters2' or a retailer's business,2 2 as distinguished from an injury to
personal feelings.
In the principal case the elements of libel are present in the wrongful
defamation by the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff's reputation. In
9. See Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (19t6).
10. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, c. 7, p. 522.
I1. Reese, Waiver of Tort in Pennsylvania, 31 DicK L. REv. 91 (1927).
12. Tightmeyer v. Mongold, supra.
13. Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 373, 17 N.E. 892, 894 (1888).
14. Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpist, 19 Yale L.J. 221 (1910).
15. Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 LAw Q.
REV. 302, 304 (1924).
16. Soe Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn. 504, 511, 34- Atl. 865, 866 (1896).
17. Pound, Equitable Relief Againt Defamation and injuries to Personality, 29
HARv. L. REv. 640, 641 (1916).
18. James v. Powell, 154 Va. 96, 152 S.E. 539 (1930) (libel); Brents v. Morgan,
221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W, 967 (1927) (privacy).
19. See Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Mass.
1940).
20. McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936)1
Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932).
21. Grisby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush 480 (Ky. 1867).
22. Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937).
CASES NOTED
order to make the waiver of the remedy possible, the same facts must state
a cause of action in either tort or assumpsit." Here the enrichment of the
defendant arising indirectly from the injury to the plaintiff does not give
rise to a fictional promise implied in law to make reimbursement. Although
it might be possible to find a property interest in the plaintiff's reputation,
the advisability of excluding libel from the group of torts in which the
plaintiff is permitted to waive the tort and substitute the fiction of a promise
implied in law is further strengthened in the instant case by the statutory
definition of libel as a personal injury.2
It is submitted that the distinction in the cases follows the division of the
two general classes of torts, designated as "property tarts," implying injuries
to real or personal property, and "personal torts," including injuries to the
person's reputation, feelings or body 25-the election of remedies allowed in
the case of "property torts" being further restricted by the requirement of
enrichment of the defendant.26
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - ABSOLUTE OR CONTINGENT
Decedent left a holographic will stating:
Remember me W. W. Bagnall by this. If any-
thing happens to me. While gone. All my belong-
ings go to ....
The instrument was written before decedent embarked on a hunting trip,
from which he returned safely and resumed his affairs until his death eight-
een years later. The purported beneficiary, decedent's brother, offered the
will for probate, but the will was contested by another brother who con-
tended that the will was contingent and inadmissible. Held, on appeal,
judgment of the appellate court reversed and that of the county probate
and district courts denying the probate of the will affirmed, as the will is
not operative due to the failure of the condition to occur. Bagnall v. Bagnall,
25 S.W.2d 401 (Texas 1949).
One of the most perplexing problems in testamentary construction re-
lates to conditional or contingent wills. A tremendous amount of legal
effort has been expended upon the subject with widely divergent conclu-
sions which cannot be reconciled. All courts agree that whether a will is to
be regarded as contingent or absolute depends upon the intention of the
23. Cooper v. Cooper, supra.
24. N.Y. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW § 37-a.
25. Mumford v. Wright, 12 Colo. App. 214, 55 Pac. 744 (1898).
26. Minor v. Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 55 Pac. 783 (1898); Soderlin v. Marquette
Nat. Bank of Minn., 214 Minn. 408, 8 N.W.2d 331 (1943)1 Otwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,
26 Wash.2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1947).
